This paper deals with the exceptions-tolerance property of generic sentences with indefinite singular and bare plural subjects (IS and BP generics, respectively) and with the way this property is connected to some well-known observations about felicity differences between the two types of generics (e.g. Lawler's 1973, Madrigals are popular vs. #A madrigal is popular). I show that whereas both IS and BP generics tolerate exceptional and contextually irrelevant individuals and situations in a strikingly similar way, which indicates the existence of a basically equivalent tolerance mechanism, there is also a difference between them, unnoticed so far, which concerns the degree to which the properties of the legitimate exceptions can be characterized in advance. Following claims in Greenberg (2003), I argue that both this newly observed difference as well as the traditional felicity differences result from an underlying contrast in the type of 'non-accidentalness' expressed by the two types of generic sentences, and more formally, in the accessibility relations that their generic quantifier (Gen) is compatible with. To capture the new difference in tolerance of exceptions, I develop an improved version of the exceptions-tolerance mechanism for generic sentences suggested in Kadmon & Landman (1993) , namely, a restriction on the set of individuals and situations quantified by Gen, which is partially vague to two different degrees using supervaluationist methods. The different degrees of vagueness in this restriction are shown to be systematically dependent on the two types of accessibility relations that IS and BP generics are compatible with, which are redefined as precise and vague restrictions on the generic quantification over worlds.
INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with two well-known puzzles in the analysis of generic sentences as in (1), which are usually discussed separately, and makes the novel claim that a proper understanding of one of these puzzles can lead to a better understanding of the other one: (1) a. A dog has four legs.
b. Dogs have four legs.
The first puzzle has to do with the well-known fact that, although sentences as in (1) express generalizations and are usually represented as headed by a generic operator with universal force, they also tolerate exceptions. For example, unlike 'Every dog has four legs', both (1a) and (1b) are considered true, although there are clear cases of three-legged dogs.
The second puzzle is that while both minimally contrasting generics with indefinite singular and bare plural subjects as in (1a) and (1b), respectively (IS and BP sentences, henceforth), express generalizations, support counterfactuals and tolerate exceptions, there are also reported differences between them. Examples of these are the 'definitional' nature of the IS generics v. the weaker 'inductive' nature of the BP ones (noted in Lawler 1973; Burton-Roberts 1977) and the felicity differences seen in example (2) (from Burton-Roberts and Lawler) and (3)-(4) (from Greenberg 2003) . The puzzle, then, is how to capture simultaneously both the similarities and differences between the two types of generics:
(2) a. #A madrigal is popular/#A room is square/#A man is blond.
b. Madrigals are popular/Rooms are square/Men are blond.
(3) a. #A Norwegian student with a name ending with 's' wears thick green socks (odd as generic, fine as existential). b. Norwegian students with names ending with 's' wear thick green socks.
(4) a. #I noticed that a thick book with a red paperback cover deals exactly with your thesis topic (odd as generic, fine as existential). b. I noticed that thick books with red paperback covers deal exactly with your thesis topic.
In this paper, I discuss a novel observation which connects these two puzzles, namely, the fact that although both IS and BP generics tolerate exceptional and contextually irrelevant entities in a strikingly similar way, the ability to specify the properties of the exceptions to BP generics like (2b)-(4b) (namely those with infelicitous IS counterparts) is much lower than the ability to specify the properties of the exceptions to IS generics. The main claim I make is that both this difference as well as the felicity differences seen in (2)-(4) are a result of an underlying contrast in the kind of modality that IS and BP generics can express, argued for in Greenberg (2003) . 1 To capture the newly observed difference, the exceptions-tolerance mechanism for both IS and BP generics is defined as a restriction on the set of individuals and situations quantified over by generic quantifier (Gen), which is systematically sensitive to the kind of modality of the sentence, namely to the restriction over worlds quantified over, and which is vague to two different degrees, using supervaluationist methods.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 examines traditional as well as novel similarities in the way IS and BP generics tolerate exceptional and contextually irrelevant individuals and situations. Section 3 deals with the newly observed contrast in the way IS and a subclass of BP generics tolerate exceptions, which indicates that the similarity in the exceptions-tolerance mechanism cannot be total. Section 4 develops an informal explanation of the contrast, based on Greenberg's (2003) theory of the two types of modalities that IS and BP generics can express. In section 5, the intuitions and observations developed in the previous sections are integrated into a unified tolerance mechanism for IS and BP generics, namely, a restriction on the domain of individual (and situations) which is sensitive to the difference in modality and which is vague to two different degrees, using a modified version of the proposal of Kadmon & Landman (1993) for a domain-vague restriction for generics. Section 6 concludes the paper and examines the advantages of the proposal over other exceptions-tolerance proposals.
TOLERANCE OF ENTITIES BY IS AND BP GENERICS: THE SIMILARITIES
In addition to the well-known observation, mentioned above, that IS and BP generics tolerate exceptional individuals, another observation about both types of generics is that these legitimate exceptions are those which are considered abnormal or 'non-standard' in some sense. The observation is common in the genericity literature (see, e.g. Delgrande 1987 Delgrande , 1988 Asher & Morreau 1995; Krifka 1995; Krifka et al. 1995; Drewery 1997; Pelletier & Asher 1997; Eckardt 1999) , but, as I will show below, current attempts to capture it precisely face problems. I will call this 'the abnormality constraint' on the exceptions to generics, and formulate it like this: An individual which is considered a legitimate exception to a generic sentence is one which, in addition to not having the VP property, is assumed to be exceptional, non-standard or abnormal in some other respect. For example, legitimate exceptions to (1) are dogs that in addition to not having four legs are those with mutations, those that have undergone an accident, etc. A much less common observation about IS and BP generics is that both can tolerate not only exceptional, but also contextually irrelevant, individuals. The traditional view about generics (e.g. Dahl 1975; Krifka 1987; Krifka et al. 1995; Condoravdi 1997) , supported by contrasts as in (5), is that unlike sentences with explicit quantifiers like 'every', generics cannot be contextually restricted: But there are many other generics which can be contextually restricted, for example, (6)- (8):
(6) (There are professors and students in this university.) A professor wears a tie/Professors wear a tie. (Can mean 'A professor/ Professors in this university') (7) (There are books and periodicals in this library.) Books/A book can be borrowed for a week, but periodicals/A periodical can only be borrowed for one day. Both IS and BP generics, then, can tolerate contextually irrelevant individuals, as well. 2 The distinction between exceptional and contextually irrelevant individuals is not always clear in the genericity literature, but in this paper I will keep emphasizing its importance. One reason for this is that the abnormality constraint applies only to the former, and not to the latter type of individuals. For example, in evaluating the IS and BP generics in (7), books in other libraries (i.e. contextually irrelevant ones) are clearly not considered abnormal-these are simply not talked about in the first place. In contrast, legitimate exceptions to (7) are books in this library which are taken as abnormal or non-standard, for example, damaged, rare or highly requested books. The same distinction is found with other IS and BP generics [e.g. (6) and (7)].
As is well known (see, e.g. Chierchia 1995), a subclass of IS and BP generics, namely those with stage-level predicates, tolerate also contextually irrelevant situations. Notice that unlike the tolerance of contextually irrelevant individuals, which is usually dependent on the utterance context, the information about irrelevant situations is contributed also by presuppositions, implicatures or real-world knowledge of the VP as well (for discussion, see e.g. Schubert & Pelletier 1988; Chierchia 1995; Carlson 1999; Cohen 1996) . For example, without knowing the utterance context for (9) (e.g. talking about this school or this country), we cannot say anything about which individual first graders are contextually relevant and which are not: (9) A first grader finishes school at 13.00/First graders finish school at 13.00.
However, even in this null context, we can say something about which situations are contextually irrelevant in (9), namely non-school days situations, since finishing school presupposes going to school. Similarly, even without knowing what the utterance context of (10) is, we easily exclude situations where the computer is off as irrelevant, because working quickly presupposes working:
(10) A Pentium computer works quickly/Pentium computers work quickly.
The presuppositions and implicatures of the VP, or the real-world knowledge about it, limit the choice of contextually (ir)relevant situations, and the utterance context (e.g. talking about what first graders do on Wednesdays) can further specify it. 3, 4 In addition to contextually irrelevant situations, both IS and BP generics with stage-level predicates tolerate also exceptional situations. Similar to the tolerance of exceptional individuals, discussed above, 3 This characteristic of contextually irrelevant situations is found not only with IS and BP generics but also with habituals with proper name subjects. Our real-world knowledge tells us that people usually (though not necessarily!) snore when they are asleep, so the salient reading of 'John snores' is roughly 'Whenever John is asleep, he snores' (although other readings, e.g. 'Whenever John is nervous he snores', are also possible in specific contexts). Similarly, the salient reading of 'John reads the Journal of Semantics' is not 'Whenever John reads, he reads the JoS', nor 'Whenever John reads a journal, he reads JoS' (although these readings are possible in certain contexts), because we know that usually people do not spend their whole reading time reading only a journal and that usually if people read journals, they read more than one. Instead, more plausible readings are 'Whenever a new issue of JoS is out, John reads it'; 'Whenever John wants to read an interesting paper, he reads JoS'; 'Whenever John is in the departmental library, he reads JoS ', etc. 4 But notice that sometimes presuppositional information about the VP can give us information about contextually irrelevant individuals as well. For example, in considering 'Snakes lay eggs', male individual snakes are considered irrelevant because the VP ('lay eggs') presupposes giving birth, which is only relevant of females (see, e.g. Carlson 1999). these are situations which are considered abnormal or less standard. In interpreting (9), for example, these can be extremely stormy day situations, or those where the prime minister comes to visit school. And in interpreting (10), these can be situations where it is extremely hot, or where the computer is placed near a strong magnet.
We saw that the abnormality constraint applies only to exceptional, and not to contextually irrelevant, entities. But there is another difference, so far unnoted, between exceptional and irrelevant entities, found with both IS and BP generics. The difference is illustrated in the listener's reactions to (6) repeated here as (11), in the The difference between (12a) and (12b) shows us that taking an irrelevant, but not an exceptional, individual as a counterexample to the generalization is evaluated as a misunderstanding. The contrast between (12c) and (12d) shows us that exactly the same holds for irrelevant and exceptional situations. Crucially, even if I, as the speaker of (11), think that Bill is an exceptional (abnormal) professor and that this legitimizes his not wearing a tie, or that this is an abnormal situation (e.g. extremely hot) and that this legitimizes Bill not wearing a tie now, the fact that my listener still takes these entities to falsify my generalization (i.e. as illegitimate exceptions) is not interpreted as a misunderstanding on his or her side, but rather as a legitimate reaction (although I can still disagree with this reaction). I will take the reactions of 'misunderstanding' in (12a,c) to indicate that the listener has failed to accommodate something in what the speaker had in mind, namely the domain restriction. This is very similar to what we feel about B's reaction to A's explicitly quantified statement in (13) in the context of talking about this class:
No student got less than 85. b. #You're wrong! Bill (a student who doesn't take this course) got 83!
The legitimacy of the listener's reaction in (12b,d) indicates that, unlike the properties of the contextually relevant entities, the properties of exceptional entities are not required to be accommodated by the listener in the first place. In section 5.1.2 below, I will show that this observation strongly supports the approach of Kadmon & Landman (1993) to Gen as a 'domainvague' quantifier. In section 6 below, I will show that it poses a problem for attempts to define Gen as weaker than universal (e.g. similar to 'most').
To summarize so far, we have seen that IS and BP generics tolerate entities in a strikingly similar way: Both can tolerate four types of entities (contextually irrelevant and exceptional individuals and contextually irrelevant and exceptional situations). In both, the information about irrelevant individuals comes from the utterance context, whereas the one about irrelevant situations comes also from presuppositions, implicatures, etc. about the VP. And in both, contextually irrelevant entities differ from exceptional entities in two ways (the presence/ absence of the abnormality constraint and the (un)necessary accommodation of properties). These similarities should be captured in any theory of IS and BP generics, and they strongly indicate that the two types of generics have the same basic tolerance mechanism.
In the next section, however, I look at data indicating that the similarity with respect to tolerance of exceptional entities is not total.
TOLERANCE OF ENTITIES BY IS AND
BP GENERICS-THE DIFFERENCE 3.1 Cases where mere abnormality is not enough . . .
Above we talked about the abnormality constraint, according to which the legitimate exceptions to generics are those considered abnormal.
A fact which is much less noted, however, is that in many cases merely being abnormal is not enough to be considered a legitimate exception. Clearly not any abnormal or non-standard dog will be considered a legitimate exception to (1), repeated here as (14). In fact, language users can quite easily divide potential abnormal dogs to those which will and those which will not be easily considered exceptions to (14), as in (14a) Notice that although the difference between the (a) and the (b) examples is rather strong, it is possible to imagine special contexts where entities in (b) are considered legitimate exceptions, e.g. in (15) cases where children with five names ending with 't' are those from royal families, which are traditionally taught reading and writing at age 4. Crucially, however, no such special context is needed in the case of the (a) examples.
3.2 . . . and cases where 'mere abnormality' is enough On the surface, the distinctions illustrated in (14)- (16), (17) may look rather trivial. As I will show below, however, understanding the mechanism behind them and trying to capture it precisely is not an easy task, and, as I will show in section 6 below, it cannot be handled by current exceptions-tolerance mechanisms. What is even more important at this stage, however, is the observation that there are generics where such apparently trivial distinctions seem much harder, if not impossible to make. Consider (17):
(17) Well-known forty-five year old teachers do not cook on Monday afternoons.
Like (14)- (16), (17) (17) to (14)- (16) above, we can see that here is it much harder, if not impossible, to predict this matter in advance. If we try to come up with a list of abnormal or non-standard well-known 45-yearold teachers, as in (18), it is much harder to divide it into those who will be easily counted as legitimate exceptions to (17), and those who do not (namely those who, given their abnormality, are not expected to have the VP property and those who, although abnormal, are still expected to have the VP property, respectively):
(18) Potential legitimate exceptions to (17): well known forty five years old teachers who are exceptionally successful/exceptionally unsuccessful/especially fat/especially thin/who have more than ten sons/who are exceptionally rich/who are exceptionally poor/who never drink tea . . .
Adding more properties to (18) does not seem to change this unclarity. In contrast, if someone were to mix the descriptions in (14a) and (14b), reasonable language users would rather easily manage to redivide the list, and probably all of them would get more or less to the same division as in (14a) and (14b) above. Notice that I am not claiming that the legitimate exceptions to sentences like (17) are not those considered abnormal or that with such sentences it is hard to characterize which individuals are normal and which are abnormal instances of the CN property. In fact, the abnormality constraint applies to sentences like (17) just as it does to sentences like (14): with both generics we assume that the legitimate exceptions are abnormal in some sense. Moreover, with both we can characterize which individuals are considered normal and which abnormal. What I am claiming is that whereas in sentences like (14) we can easily tell which of the abnormal individuals are relevant for legitimizing exceptions and which are not, in (17) we cannot. With generics like (14), then, the degree to which we can specify the abnormality relevant for legitimate exceptions is high, whereas with generics like (17), it is very low.
The connection to the IS/BP puzzle
The crucial observation I would like to make now is that there is a correlation between the ability to specify the legitimate exceptions, we have just discussed, and the ability to have a felicitous IS generic. Specifically, those BP generics whose legitimate exceptions are hard to characterize are exactly the ones whose IS counterparts are infelicitous. Whereas (14)- (16) ). In the same manner, thinking about all kinds of abnormal madrigals, rooms, thick books with red paperback covers, etc., it is hard to predict which will be considered legitimate exceptions to the BP generics in (2b) and (4b) above, and which will not. The new observation is schematically summarized in (20): (20) The degree to which the properties of the exceptions to a generic can be specified is high with felicitous IS generics and their BP counterparts but very low with BP counterparts, of infelicitous IS generics.
Obviously, we want to explain the correlation in (20). This, however, is not straightforward given the current views about IS and BP generics. Most current theories of genericity (e.g. Schubert and Pelletier 1988; Wilkinson 1991; Chierchia 1995 Chierchia , 1998 Krifka 1995; Krifka et al. 1995; ter Meulen 1995) ignore the felicity contrasts between characterizing IS and BP sentences described above, and assign them an equivalent semantic representation, including an equivalent exceptionstolerance mechanism. Such theories will have difficulties deriving the contrast in characterizing exceptions described in (20) . Of the few theories which do attempt to capture the felicity contrasts between IS and BP generics, almost all (e.g. Krifka 1987; Dobrovie-Sorin & Laca 1996; Cohen , 2001a assign IS and BP generics two completely different semantic structure (namely, quantificational and predicational). Such theories will have problems capturing the strong similarities between minimally contrasting IS and BP generics, namely the fact that both express non-accidental, counterfactual supporting generalizations, and the range of similarities between them concerning the way they tolerate entities, described in section 2. What we need, then, is a theory which attempts to formally capture both the strong similarities and differences between IS and BP sentences and which could lead to an explanation of the generalization in (20). In the next section, I introduce Greenberg's (2003) theory of generics and show how it achieves exactly these needs.
A THEORY OF IS/BP GENERICS AND
WHAT IT EXPLAINS 4.1 IS and BP generics have a basically equivalent semantic structure with different accessibility relations Greenberg (2003) argues that while both IS and BP sentences express non-accidental, modalized generalizations, they differ in the type of non-accidentalness they can express. Formally, IS and BP generics are taken to have the same basic structure as in (21), where P and Q are the subject and VP properties, respectively, and the superscript 'cont.norm' is a restriction on P which stands for 'contextually relevant and normal' (to be made precise in section 5 below). Example (21) roughly says that in all appropriately accessible worlds, every contextually relevant and normal P individual has the Q property in these worlds:
Following, for example, the line of thought of Heim (1982) , Chierchia (1995) or Krifka et al. (1995) , the universal quantifiers over accessible worlds and individuals in (21) capture the non-accidentalness of generics and the generalizations over individuals they make, respectively 5 . (Discussion of quantification and tolerance of situations is dealt with below).
To capture the contrasts between IS and BP generics (e.g. the felicity differences between them), Greenberg (2003) argues that their modal nature, that is their accessibility relations, are different. While both IS and BP generics can involve what is called an 'in-virtue-of ' accessibility relation, the other, 'descriptive', accessibility relation is available for BP generics only. The following two sections give a summary of these claims.
IS sentences express only in-virtue-of generalizations
Following Kratzer's (1981) and Brennan's (1993) works on non-generic root or 'circumstantial' modality, Greenberg (2003) argues that IS sentences, like A dog has four legs or A boy does not cry, necessarily assert that the generalization they express is true in virtue of a certain property that the subject is assumed to have (e.g. 'having a four legged genetic makeup' or 'being tough', respectively), that the speaker has in mind and the listener has to accommodate. Formally, the accessibility relation of the sentence is what captures this in-virtue-of part. Suppose if you hear, for example, (22a) and (23a), and the in-virtue-of properties you accommodate are 'has a four legged genetic makeup' and 'be tough', respectively, then the sentences will be interpreted as in (22b) and (23b) Sometimes it is hard to determine which in-virtue-of property the speaker has in mind. Consider (24)- (25): (24) An accountant in this place hardly pays taxes (in virtue of being covered by the local legislation/in virtue of being deeply dishonest/in virtue of earning almost nothing/in virtue of having connections with the mayor . . .).
(25) A woman in this town does not walk alone outside (in virtue of living in such a violent place/in virtue of living in such religious town/in virtue of having so many children . . .).
Without supporting context, the listener may end up accommodating the 'wrong' in-virtue-of properties in (24) and (25), that is not the one that the speaker has in mind. This is very similar to what happens with Kratzer's (1981) examples of circumstantial modality, as in 'I cannot play the trombone', which can be thought to be true in view of the physical condition of the trombone, the physical condition of the speaker, the fact that speaker does not know how to play, etc. What is crucial, though, is that as with Kratzer's example, hearing sentences like (24) and (25) the listener still assumes that there is, indeed, a unique in-virtue-of property that the speaker has in mind, which he/she has to accommodate and that this in-virtue-of part fixes the accessibility relation of the sentence. The general form of in-virtue-of generics, then, is (26), where P, Q and S C stand for the denotations of the subject, VP and the contextually supplied in-virtue-of property, respectively:
In all worlds where P 4 Q, all contextually relevant and normal Ps have Q' Now, Greenberg (2003) argues that the choice of the in-virtue-of properties is not arbitrary but constrained by two real-world-based presuppositional requirements. The first is that the in-virtue-of property must be associated, given the common ground, with the subject property. A property S is associated with a property P in a world w iff "x P(x) / S(x) follows known facts, norms, stereotypes, etc. in w, that is iff this universal statement holds in all worlds which are epistemically or deontically or stereotypically accessible from w. Clearly, without this presuppositional requirement, one could wrongly take a clearly false IS sentence like 'A dog has three legs' to be true, for example, in virtue of having a three-legged genetic makeup. The association presupposition prevents this, since the property 'having a three legged genetic makeup' is not associated with being a dog, and hence cannot serve as S in (26). In addition, the association presupposition explains the infelicity of IS generics like (3a) above: Out of context we do not have (non-trivial) shared knowledge, norms or stereotypes about 'extremely unnatural' properties like being a Norwegian student whose name ends with 's'. Thus, there is no (non-trivial) property we associate with P, and the 'association' presupposition on the choice of the S property is not met.
In addition, the in-virtue-of, S, property should be taken as a reasonable causer of properties of the sort of the VP property. Thus, although false, 'A dog has three legs' is felicitous since intuitively we can find a property associated with being a dog which reasonably causes having a specific number of legs (a property of the sort of 'has three legs'). In contrast, '#A man is blond' is infelicitous since, although there are many properties we associate with being a man ('having male organs', 'loving sports', etc.), none is taken to reasonably cause having a specific hair colour (i.e. a property of the sort of 'being blond').
Formally, we take S to reasonably cause the sort of Q iff there is good possibility that the disjunction ["x S(x) / Q(x)] _ ["x S(x) / :Q(x)] holds, where good possibility is defined as truth in a world w, maximally similar to w 0 . Notice that this world w cannot be w 0 itself. In our world, for example, it is not true that every individual with a four-legged genetic makeup has four legs or that every such individual does not have four legs, because of the well-known mutations, accidents, etc. Nor should this world w be a world where everything takes its normal course of events relative to w 0 , as in Krifka's (1995) 'most normal worlds' suggestion for generics or Dowty's (1979) inertia worlds proposal for the progressive, since such a world would not be free of mutations or accident either. These can be seen as part of the natural course of events in our world as well (clearly a world completely free of accidents, mutations, etc. will be considered truly abnormal from the point of view of our world). Rather, following the lines of Landman's (1992) modification of Dowty's inertia worlds proposal, we take S to reasonably cause the sort of Q iff there is a world w, maximally similar to ours, except that S is allowed to develop on the basis of what is internal to it, with no external interruptions, and in this world the disjunction ["
In such a world, for example, we indeed expect having a four-legged genetic makeup to lead to having four legs or to not having four legs, and mutations, accidents, etc. do not intervene.
Notice that the choice of the in-virtue-of properties and their relation to the VP properties is not a matter of objective facts only, but is heavily dependent on the beliefs, stereotypes, norms, etc. of the speaker (and the accommodation of the listener). This is because formally, both the association relation as well as the reasonable causation relation are required to hold not in the actual world w 0 , but in worlds similar to w given some norms or given what our beliefs about causation relations are. This may look problematic, as far as the truth conditions of generics are concerned, but I think it reflects, in fact, important observations about in-virtue-of generics, such as the fact that the felicity of IS generics depends on the beliefs/stereotypes/ norms available in the common ground. Thus, the felicity of the out of the blue (3a) can significantly improve in the context of (27), whereas in the context of (28), it is again infelicitous as generic and gets a salient existential reading:
(27) There are very interesting traditions in Norway concerning professions and names. For example a Norwegian student whose name ends with 's' wears thick green socks.
(28) I walked in the dorms and noticed that a Norwegian student whose name ends with 's' wears thick green socks.
Example (27) improves the status of (3a) since in this context we can associate some property with the subject, P, property, namely obeying certain Norwegian traditions concerning names. In contrast, nothing in (28c) leads to associating a property with P, so the generic reading is again hard to get. In general, then, even if objectively there is some non-accidental property true of every P individuals, which systematically causes the sort of Q, unless the speaker knows or believes it (and the listener accommodates it), the IS generic is infelicitous.
BP sentences can express both in-virtue-of and descriptive generalizations
Unlike IS generics, BP ones are ambiguous between an 'in-virtue-of ' reading and a 'descriptive' reading which merely asserts that the generalization is non-accidental, 6 that is expected to hold in other possible worlds. Crucially, in this reading, we do specify the in-virtueof factor. Formally, we do not specify the exact sense in which the possible worlds quantified over are similar to ours. Instead, these worlds are defined more vaguely as maximally, or overall similar to w 0 , using Stalnaker's (1968) or Lewis's (1973) terminology.
'Boys don't cry', for example, is ambiguous. It can express both an in-virtue-of generalization, just like its IS counterpart 'A boy does not cry' (asserting that 'every (relevant and normal) boy does not cry' holds in all worlds where 'every boy is tough' holds), and also a descriptive generalization, which is especially appropriate as a conclusion of some inductive inference. Think about someone watching the behaviour of enough boys in various 'tear-inducing' situations. This speaker may use this sentence to assert that not crying is not accidental of boys, but crucially he/she does not try to convey the factor in virtue of which the generalization holds. Maybe he/she does not even know what this factor is, and even if he/she does, conveying it is not an integral part of the assertion, so the listener is not committed to accommodate it. The sentence, then, has an interpretation along the lines of (29), asserting that in all worlds in the union set of w 0 and the set of worlds which are maximally similar to w 0 (except from what is needed to allow for the existence of different or non-actual boys), every contextually relevant and normal boy does not cry:
Crucially, although BP sentences are potentially ambiguous, there are cases where the only possible reading they can have is descriptive. These are exactly the cases seen in (2b)- (4b) above (e.g. 'Norwegian students whose names end with ''s'' wear thick green socks'), namely, those where no appropriate in-virtue-of property is available in the context, so the 'in-virtue-of ' reading is blocked. Since IS sentences can only express 'in-virtue-of ' generalizations, the IS counterparts of such BP sentences [e.g. (2a)- (4a)] are infelicitous as generic. Since the BP sentences are potentially ambiguous, they are still felicitous in such cases, but crucially, they are unambiguously descriptive. 
Back to the contrast in tolerating exceptions-the intuitive explanation
We are now in a position to explain the correlation summarized in (20) above, between the ability to characterize legitimate exceptions and the ability to have a felicitous IS generic. Given the claims made above about IS and BP generics, we can now rephrase (20) as (30): (30) The degree to which the properties of the exceptions to a generic can be specified is high with in-virtue-of generics (where an invirtue-of property is available), but very low with unambiguously descriptive generics (where no such in-virtue-of property is available).
We can now explain (30) in the following way: Once a language user has in mind in virtue of what the generalization is true, he/she can predict, at least to some extent, which properties characterize the exceptions. Intuitively, these properties are those which are taken, from the point of view of w 0 , to block the 'reasonable causation' relation between the in-virtue-of and the VP property. Assuming that 'A dog has four legs' holds in virtue of having a four-legged genetic makeup, for example, the legitimate exceptions are dogs with properties which are taken to block the reasonable causation relation between 'having a four-legged genetic makeup' and 'having 4 legs', that is properties in (31a), but not in (31b), even though the latter can be taken as abnormal properties of dogs, just like the former:
(31) a. Undergoing an accident, having mutations, being part of a medical experiment. b. Having a vocal cords problem, having 5 names, loving semantics.
Consider, in contrast, a BP sentence like (3b) ('Norwegian students whose names end with ''s'' wear thick green socks'), which is, as claimed above, unambiguously descriptive. All we assert in uttering such sentences is that the generalization is non-accidental, crucially, without specifying (or even knowing) in virtue of what it is non-accidentally true. Thus, it is much harder (if not impossible) to say which properties block the in-virtue-of (i.e. the reasonable causation) relation and consequently which properties characterize the legitimate exceptions. All we can say is that these properties must be abnormal in some sense, but we cannot specify the right 'sense' of the abnormality relevant here.
There are two pieces of data which support this line of thought. The first is that there are, in fact, IS sentences like (24) and (25), repeated here, where characterizing the legitimate exceptions seems very hard, similar to descriptive BP generics like (3b):
(24) An accountant in this place hardly pays taxes (in virtue of being covered by the local legislation/of being deeply dishonest/of earning almost nothing/of having the right connections with the mayor . . .)
(25) A woman in this town does not walk alone outside (in virtue of living in such a violent place/of living in such religious town/of having so many children . . .)
Hearing (24) and (25) out of the blue, it is hard to determine how the legitimate exceptions to these sentences will look like. Are the legitimate exceptions to (24) accountants in this place who earn lots of money? those who earn very little? those who work under the direct supervision of their manager? very new ones? very old ones? are the legitimate exceptions in the case of (25) women in this town who are fully armed? those who have a special permission from the local rabbi? both? Once the sentences are uttered in context, however, and a unique in-virtue-of property is chosen, the apparent vagueness with respect to the exceptions is to a large extent resolved. For example, armed woman can be taken as legitimate exceptions to (25) if we accommodate 'in-virtue-of living in such a dangerous place', whereas woman with a special permission from the rabbi can be taken as exceptions if we accommodate 'living in such a religious town'.
The second support comes from examining exceptional situations to habitual sentences with referential subjects. Like BP generics, these habituals are potentially ambiguous between an in-virtue-of and descriptive generics.
8 'Mary walks to school', for example, can make a descriptive generalization, based on watching Mary for a couple of mornings, and merely asserting that her walking to school in every relevant and normal situation is not accidental, without having in mind (or even knowing) the in-virtue-of factor. Crucially, in this case it is hard to characterize in which abnormal situations we expect her not to go to school and in which of them we still expect her? to go to school (stormy situations? situations where she is offered a lift? where she has an exceptional amount of money? where she sleeps by a friend? all of them? etc.).
This unclarity is resolved to a large extent when the context shows that the sentence is asserted in virtue of a certain property and when such a property is accommodated. For example, assuming that Mary walks to school in virtue of not having money for the bus, we could predict that when she is offered a lift by her friend, she would not walk to school, that is this situation will be considered legitimately exceptional. But if we assume that Mary walks to school in virtue of her wish to train herself for long walks, then it will be exceptionally stormy days, and not days when she is offered a lift, which will be considered legitimately exceptional.
FORMALLY CHARACTERIZING THE TOLERANCE MECHANISM OF IS AND BP GENERICS
We are now in a position to integrate the observations and intuitions developed in the previous sections into a precisely defined exceptionstolerance mechanism of IS and BP generics. I start by reviewing the 8 This similarity between BP generics and habituals with referential subjects is one of the indications that the availability of both in-virtue-of and descriptive readings with BP sentences should be derived from the potentially referential status of BP NPs (see, e.g. Carlson (1977) and more recently Chierchia's (1998) analysis of BP NPs as kind referring even in characterizing sentences). In contrast, the fact that IS sentences are only compatible with an 'in virtue of a property' modality should be derived from the property-only interpretation of IS NPs. A fully compositional account deriving the difference in truth conditions of IS and BP sentences from the semantic difference between IS and BP NPs, however, is well beyond the scope of this paper (but see Greenberg 2003 for a preliminary suggestion along these lines).
supervaluationist proposal of Kadmon & Landman (1993) for a 'domain-vague restriction' on Gen. This will supply us with the formal tools for capturing the degree to which the properties of the exceptions can or cannot be specified. Kadmon & Landman (1993) (K&L, henceforth) take the generic operator, Gen, to be universal and modalized, 9 and propose to account for the tolerance of exceptions by a restriction on the quantification over individuals.
5.1
10 To capture the difference between generics like 'An owl hunts mice' and universals like 'Every owl hunts mice', K&L propose that in the latter the restriction is precise: the speaker has in mind a precise set of restricting properties, even if he/she does not specify them explicitly, which is supposed to be accommodated by the listener (often with the help of context). In context, then, no relevant individual can be excluded from the quantification, and no exceptions are tolerated. In contrast, the set of properties restricting Gen is vague:
For a generic statement there is no well-defined set of objects that the universal statement ranges over. We don't expect the context of utterance to make clear what the objects are exactly that the generalization expressed applies to. And we don't attempt to accommodate a precise set of objects. Hence, when we encounter objects that do not fall under the generalization expressed, there is always the possibility that they are not among the objects that the generalization is supposed to apply to, and we are therefore able to regard them as legitimate exceptions (409). . . . What we would like to propose, then, is that it is an integral part of the nature of generic statements that the restricting set of properties is vague . . . Saying ''An owl hunts mice'' is just like saying ''every (possible) owl with the right properties hunts mice'', while, crucially not committing yourself to what the right properties are. (408, original emphasis) 9 Kadmon & Landman deal only with IS generics (and do not attempt to explain the differences between them and their BP counterparts).
10 A general problem for restricting the subject domain of generics, pointed out by Carlson (1999) , is posed by sequences like 'Pheasants lay speckled eggs. Once rare, they now number in the millions' (10). Intuitively, the first sentence talks only about female (birthing) pheasants. But if this is done by restricting the domain of the BP, then we have a problem since the pronoun in the second sentence, which seems to refer back to the BP, refers to pheasants in general. One direction of solving this problem is to assume that anaphora in generically interpreted expressions may work differently from anaphora in extensional sentences. Another possible suggestion is that the BP and the pronoun in this sentence are both originally interpreted as kinds (and anaphora is allowed), and at a later stage some type-shifting operation takes place (as suggested in, e.g. Cohen 1999) and we get quantified structure with two different domain restrictions.
K&L's proposal is based on the following intuitive observation:
We feel that when you use a generic NP, you are not trying to be precise . . . It is not supposed to be clear to your hearers exactly what owls are supposed to actually hunt mice. Adult owls? Healthy owls? Ones that live in nature? Ones that are not spoiled by some person who brings them food? Ones that have mice to hunt? Ones that don't happen to be crazy? . . . And so on and so forth. (407) Notice that this observation is very similar to the one we had above, about the difficulty in characterizing the exceptions to unambiguously descriptive BP generics. As I will show below, however, these two observations are not equivalent.
Formally, K&L take Gen to be a nominal GQ, and define a domainvague restriction on the CN property. I will adapt their definitions to present framework, in which Gen is a sentential operator. In the case of (32), for example, I will represent the domain-vague restriction on the set of professors as the superscript 'Xprofessor', as in (33) K&L take the domain-vague restriction to be a pair AEv 0 , Vae. v 0 is the precise part of the restriction, that is a (possibly empty) consistent set of properties, all of them compatible with the CN property ('professor'), which is directly provided by the context. In contrast, V is the vague part of the restriction. K&L follow the supervaluationist approach to vagueness, originally developed by, for example, Kamp (1975) and Fine (1975) to deal with vague predicates like 'tall', 'bald', etc., according to which the core characteristic of vagueness is that there are various possible ways to resolve it and get to a precise statement or, using Fine's terminology, various possible 'precisifications'. Crucially, with vague predicates there is no way to completely determine which of these precisifications are better than the others, so we are left with all of them. Following this line of thought, K&L define V as a set of precisifications on v 0 -that is as a set of sets of properties, each of which is (a) consistent, (b) contains only properties compatible with the CN property and (c) is a superset of v 0 (the contextually supplied properties). In the case of (33), for example, each precisification in V has 'in this university' as a member, together with other properties. Thus, the precisifications (sets of properties) can be {in this university, V 1 , V 2 , V 3 , V 4 }, {in this university, V 1 , V 6 , V 8 , V 16 }, {in this university, V 3 , V 4 , V 11 , V 20 }, etc. (where V stands for a property). Each such precisification in V represents one possible way of making the restriction precise (which is compatible with what is already known from the context), where crucially, there is at least one context where we do not determine which of these 'ways of making the restriction precise' are better than others and consequently where all precisifications are available.
Thus, even if we encounter a professor who does not wear a tie, there is a possibility that he lacks a property in one of the (unchosen) precisifications, and is thus not quantified over. Consequently, this professor can be considered a legitimate exception to (32).
K&L's suggestion naturally captures the interaction, discussed in section 2, between irrelevant and exceptional individuals tolerated by generics. While contextually irrelevant individuals are excluded from the domain of quantification by considering properties in the precise part of the restriction, namely v 0 , exceptional individuals are excluded by assuming that they lack a property in one of the unspecified precisifications in the vague part V.
K&L's suggestion also explains the observation made in section 2, that taking a contextually irrelevant individual, but not an exceptional individual, as a counterexample to a generic statement is evaluated as a misunderstanding. In K&L's definitions, only the properties of the relevant entities are in the precise part of the restriction and need to be accommodated. In contrast, properties of the non-exceptional entities are in the vague part, that is in the set of precisifications, and since the speaker does not necessarily have in mind a unique precisification, the listener is not expected to accommodate it either.
Finally, using K&L's framework we can easily capture the observation, made in section 2, that IS and BP generics tolerate situations in a way strikingly similar to the way they tolerate individuals. Assuming that VPs denote sets of situations, we do that by imposing a domain-vague restriction on the set of situations quantified over by Gen. For example, (32) will be represented as in (34), where the superscript 'Ywear-a-tie' is the domain-vague restriction on the set of situations: (34) can be defined as the set {being a formally dressed situation}, so, for example, shower situations are considered irrelevant. 11 In contrast to k 0 , K, the vague part of the restriction over situations is a set of precisifications on k 0 , namely, a set of sets of properties of situations, each of them is a superset of k 0 , for example, {being a formally dressed situation, K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , K 4 }, {being a formally dressed situation, K 2 , K 3 , K 5 , K 6 }, {being a formally dressed situation, K 5 , K 7 , K 8 , K 6 }, etc (where K is a property of situations). Each such precisification represents one way of making the restriction over situations precise, and again, there is at least one context where no unique precisification is chosen. Thus, K excludes from quantification all situations which lack a property in one of the (unchosen) precisifications, and by that allows tolerance of exceptional situations, whose characterization is vague.
As mentioned above, irrelevant or exceptional situations are tolerated only when the VP is stage level. This can be easily captured by requiring both k 0 and all sets of properties in K to be empty with individual-level VPs [like 'have four legs' as in (1)], so all situations end up being quantified over in such cases, and non of them is tolerated. K&L's approach, then, is also productive in capturing the tolerance of situations by generics. In the remainder of the paper, I will focus again on the tolerance of individuals. 5.1.2 Some problems and the direction of an improved theory K&L's vague restriction, however, cannot be the whole story regarding the exceptions puzzle since it is, in fact, too vague. The only limitations imposed on it are that all sets of properties in it are consistence and that it contains only properties which are compatible with the CN property. Besides these two 'logical' limitations, K&L's definition imposes no constraint on which property can and which cannot be part of the precisifications. It thus wrongly predicts any property whatsoever to potentially legitimize exceptions.
As seen above, however, language users have two systematic intuitions about which properties can and which cannot legitimize exceptions. The first is the abnormality constraint, according to which, for example, having a mutation, but not having a tail, will be a property of legitimate exceptions to (1). In addition, with in-virtue-of generics we also have a further 'relevant abnormality' constraint, according to which e.g. 'undergoing an accident', but not 'having vocal problems' will characterize the exceptions to (1). K&L's definition cannot capture these two systematic constraints since there is nothing in it which will guarantee that some properties should be preferred members of the precisifications over other properties. All properties have an equal status.
More generally, K&L's definitions allow only two possibilities in the restriction of generics, total specificity (with respect to the properties of the irrelevant entities, excluded by v 0 ) and total vagueness (with respect to the properties of the legitimate exceptions, excluded by V), whereas in reality language users take the characterization of the exceptions to generics to be partially vague: though there is no precise list of properties of exceptions, we are not totally ignorant concerning their characterization. Moreover, the restriction is partially vague to two different degrees: a high one (with unambiguously descriptive generics, involving mere abnormality) and a lower one (with in-virtue-of generics, involving relevant abnormality). Our goal, then, is to define two constraints on K&L's restriction, which capture these two degrees of vagueness.
The abnormality constraint on K&L's domain-vague restriction
The abnormality constraint holds for both in-virtue-of and descriptive generics: In both cases, we take the properties which legitimize exceptions to be those considered abnormal. One way to think about this intuition is to define abnormal as 'true of the minority'. Thus, if a property is assumed to hold of the minority of contextually relevant P individuals, then individuals having it are considered abnormal, and, thus, legitimate exceptions to the generic. Definition (35) is an attempt to make this idea precise:
(35) The abnormality constraint on K&L's domain-vague restriction: Any set of properties v in V is such that j\v \ P in cj is not significantly smaller than j\v 0 \ P in cj.
Example (35) says that that the number of the P individuals who have the properties in any of the precisifications v in V is not significantly smaller in the context c than the number of contextually relevant P individuals as a whole. Consider, for example, (36), its representation in (37) and the abnormality constraint on the vague restriction 'Xfirst grader' in (38):
(36) (Context: talking about this school) First graders finish school at 13.00.
(37) "w#[w# R w 0 / "x first grader Xfirst grader (x, w#) / finish at 13.00 (x, w#)] (38) Abnormality constraint on Xfirst grader: j\v \ first grader in cj is not significantly smaller than in this school \ first grader in cj.
The contextually supplied property in v 0 for (37) is 'in this school'. According to (38) , no matter which properties we put in each precisification v in V in 'Xfirst grader', and no matter which precisification v we look at, the result of intersecting these properties with the property of first graders will yield a set which is not significantly smaller than the set of first graders in this school. That is, the result is always the significant majority of first graders in this school.
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Crucially, this means that not only the intersection of properties but also any single property in any precisification must hold of the majority of relevant individuals (e.g. of first graders in this school), since if we were 12 The claim that generics quantify over the majority of the members of the subject set is made in Cohen (1996 . See section 6 for a brief comparison between Cohen's approach and the present one.
13 As a reviewer correctly points out, this definition cannot help us account for the fact that BP generics like (i) and (ii) (sometimes called 'Port-Royal puzzle generics') can be true even if only a minority of the members of the subject set has the VP property: (i) Dutchmen are good sailors.
(ii) Frenchmen eat horsemeat. In this paper, however, I follow, for example, the approach of Krifka et al. (1995) , who claim that such BP sentences do not seem to be characterizing generics at all, but rather Direct Kind Predication (DKP) structures, which do not involve generic quantification. Thus, sentences like (i) and (ii) are not supposed to be subject to definitions like (35) regarding the domain-vague restriction on the Gen. Krifka et al. (1995) show that, unlike a BP sentence like (i), which seems to mean that 'the Dutch distinguish themselves from other comparable nations by having good sailors' (82), the IS counterpart of (i), namely (iii), has the stronger and more standard 'characterizing' generic interpretation according to which 'we can more or less expect that a random Dutchman will turn out to be a good sailor' (82):
(iii) A Dutchman is a good sailor. To this observation we can add two more: First, unlike standard characterizing generics, sentences like (i) and (ii) do not support counterfactuals in the usual way. For example, (i) does not support the truth of 'If my brother was a Dutchman, he would probably also be a good sailor'. Second, the subjects of all examples of BP sentences with a 'Port-Royal puzzle' interpretation I am aware of refer to well-established kinds like nationalities [as in (i) and (ii)] or biological kinds, as in 'Tigers eat people ' (from Cohen 2001b) . This further supports the claim that such generics express DKP, and not generic quantification. (But see, e.g. Cohen (1996 Cohen ( , 2001b for a quantificational, probabilitybased analysis to such generics, called 'relative generics ' by him.) trying to intersect a property of the minority with all other properties in v, the intersection could never yield the majority of relevant individuals, as required by (35). This correctly captures our intuitions about what the abnormality constraint means: only properties of the minority (abnormal properties like having no school bag or being younger than 4 years old) are necessarily excluded from the restriction, and only individuals with such properties (i.e. abnormal individuals) are not quantified over, and are therefore considered legitimate exceptions to (36).
Notice that whereas according to (35) a precisification can have only properties of majority as members, it clearly does not have all such properties as members. If the precisifications contained all properties of the majority (e.g. 'not being called David', 'not being called Susan', 'not being called Harry', 'not being called Mary', etc.), then we would be wrongly left with no individual to quantify over, and this would contradict (35), according to which we should end up with the majority of relevant individuals. This also means that simply being a property of the majority does not necessarily put you in the precisifications and the restriction on Gen. If this were the case, then assuming, for example, that 'not having a name beginning with A' is a property of the majority (of first graders in this school), we would wrongly predict (36) to be automatically interpreted as 'First graders (in this school) whose names do not begin with 'A' finish at 13.00'. But we do not. All that (35) requires is that each precisification should consist of a certain combination of properties of the majority, and this is easily met if this combination has only part of these properties. Example (35), then, does not make any prediction about 'not having a name beginning in A' or about any other specific property of the majority (being such a property you may or may not end up in the restriction). It does make predictions about properties of the minority (being such a property necessarily prevents you from being in the restriction).
Finally, notice that a consequence of definition (35) is that although the legitimate exceptions to generic sentences are still considered 'abnormal', as the widely held intuition says, we clearly do not use the term 'abnormal' in its everyday, common use as 'far from the norm' or 'not stereotypical'. Rather, the term means (roughly) 'has certain properties (or a property) of the minority'. This is a welcome result, since, as a reviewer correctly pointed out, a generic like (24) above can be true even if the only well-known 45-year-old teacher who does cook on Monday afternoons is Ann, who is the most stereotypical wellknown 45-year-old teacher. Put in other words, the most stereotypical member of the set can clearly be considered a legitimate exception to a generic. Indeed, such a member cannot be considered 'abnormal' in the everyday use of the word of 'far form the norm' or 'far from the stereotype'. However, in the present theory, 'abnormal' does not have this everyday use, but the weaker use 'has a property of the minority'. Thus, using the definition of 'abnormality' in (35) is compatible with a stereotypical member of a set being a legitimate exception to a generic sentence, since even such members have 'properties of the minority'. A general advantage of the present theory, then, is that it clarifies the meaning of what 'abnormal' is and what it is not, as far as generic sentences are concerned. 14 5.3 The relevant abnormality constraint on K&L's domain-vague restriction
The abnormality constraint in (35) captures correctly the way exceptions to descriptive generics are tolerated. But this is not enough for in-virtueof generics. As seen above, here we need also to capture the fact that the exceptions are relevantly abnormal, where 'relevantly abnormal' means 'being a property which blocks the reasonable causation relation between the in-virtue-of property, S, and the VP property, Q'. We start, then, by defining a set of blocking properties B AEAES,Qae,wae , as in (39): (39) B 2 B AEAES,Qae,wae iff B is taken to be a property which, from the point of view of w, 'blocks' the reasonable causation relation between S (the in-virtue-of property) and Q (the VP property).
For example, B AEAEhave a four legged genetic makeup, have four legsae, wae is the set of properties which, from the point of view of w, block the reasonable causation between having a four-legged genetic makeup and having four legs. 'Having a mutation', 'undergoing an accident' or 'cutting off one's leg' are intuitively in this set, while 'being yellow' or 'having vocal problems' is not.
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An important observation about B AEAES,Qae,wae is that this is, in fact, a vague set of properties, that is, a vague second-order property. We can think about this vagueness very similarly to the way the vagueness of first-order properties, like 'bald', is treated in supervaluations theories. Take again B AEAEhave a four legged genetic makeup, have four legsae, wae . Properties like 'having a mutation in the gene responsible for number of legs' or 'cutting off one's own leg' are definitely in this set (in supervaluationist terms: they are in the positive extension and hence present in all precisifications). Other properties, like 'being infertile' or 'having vocal problems', are definitely not in this set (they are in the negative extension and hence absent from all precisifications). And still other properties, for example, 'living in an area with many traps' or 'having a serious blood infection', are borderline cases (present in only some precisifications). Speakers can be uncertain whether these properties do or do not block the reasonable causation relation between 'having a four legged genetic makeup' and 'having four legs'. Another example is (25) above ('A woman in this place does not walk alone outside'). Suppose (25) is uttered in context, so one unique in-virtue-of property is accommodated, for example, 'in virtue of living in a violent place'. Thus, we are interested in the set of 'blocking' properties B AEAEliving in this dangerous place, not walking alone outsideae, wae . This set is vague as well, with properties in its positive extension, for example, 'being fully armed'; in its negative extension, for example, 'having a name ending with f ' and crucially, also with borderline blocking properties, for example, 'being the mafia leader's wife'. It may be unclear whether this latter property indeed blocks a woman in this violent place from walking alone outside, or not.
In supervaluationist terms, the vagueness of the set of blocking properties B AEAES,Qae,wae means that this set of properties is, in fact, a set of sets of properties. We redefine, then, B AEAES,Qae,wae as in (40) and (41) [B AEAES,Qae,wae } (present in no set of B AEAES,Qae,wae ). c. The set of borderline blocking properties is {b: b 2 [B AEAES,Qae,wae b ; \B AEAES,Qae,wae } (present in some, but not all sets of B AEAES,Qae,wae ).
Turning back to generics, we want to ensure that (a) the legitimate exceptions to in-virtue-of generics are those individuals with blocking properties and (b) any vagueness in characterizing the legitimate exceptions to in-virtue-of generics is due to the vagueness of what is and what is not considered a blocking property. We achieve that in (42), the relevant abnormality constraint on the domain-vague restriction, by requiring that besides the contextually supplied properties, the properties in the restriction on Gen are the complements of the blocking properties defined in (40) and (41) Definition (42a) is K&L's requirement that every precisification in the restriction is a superset of v 0 -the set of contextually supplied properties. Definition (42bi)-(42biii) guarantees that, besides the properties in v 0 , complements of definitely blocking properties are definitely in the restriction, complements of definitely non-blocking properties are definitely not in the restriction, and borderline blocking properties are borderline properties in the restriction.
To see how (42) works, take again (1) ('A dog has four legs'). In this sentence, the set of contextually supplied restricting properties v 0 is empty (i.e. there are no contextually irrelevant dogs). The relevant abnormality constraint in (42bi) correctly guarantees that we end up definitely quantifying over all dogs that do not have mutations or who did not undergo an accident. These properties are the complements of the definitely blocking properties in B AEAEhave a four legged genetic makeup, have four legsae, wae , and thus, given (42bi), present in all sets of properties the restriction of Gen. Consequently, dogs with mutations or who did undergo accidents are definitely not quantified over in the first place, and are thus definitely predicted to be legitimate exceptions to (1), as our intuitions tell us. On the other hand, since 'living in an area with many traps' is a borderline member of B AEAEhave a four legged genetic makeup, have four legsae, wae , its complement ('not living in an area with many traps') is present in only some of the precisifications in the restriction on Gen given (42biii). Thus, we have vagueness concerning whether dogs living in an area with many traps will or will not characterize the legitimate exceptions to (1). Finally, since being infertile or having vocal problems are definitely non-blocking properties (they are present in no precisification of B AEAEhave a four legged genetic makeup, have four legsae, wae ), their complements (being fertile and not having vocal problems) are present in no sets of properties in the restriction, as (42bii) dictates. Thus, infertile dogs or dogs with vocal problems are not excluded from the quantification over Gen. Consequently, unless they happen to have some other 'blocking property', infertile dogs or dogs with vocal problems are not considered legitimate exceptions to (1), and thus (correctly) predicted to be covered by the generalization in (1). 16 
Back to the contrast in characterizing exceptions
We are now in a position to explain precisely the generalizations in (20) and (30), above, summarized here as (43): (43) The degree to which the properties of the exceptions to a generic can be specified is high with in-virtue-of generics (i.e. IS generics and their BP counterparts) but very low with unambiguously descriptive generics (i.e. BP generics with infelicitous IS counterparts).
In the section above we saw that the domain-vague restriction of invirtue-of generics is limited by the relevant abnormality constraint in (42) (in addition to the abnormality constraint in (35)). This enables us to specify both the positive and the negative extension of the restriction of Gen (by specifying the positive and negative extension of B AEAES,Qae,wae ), so the only source of vagueness in the characterization of the legitimate exceptions are the borderline properties in the restriction, that is, the borderline properties in the vague set B AEAES,Qae,wae [e.g. 'living in an area with many traps', in the case of (1)]. In contrast, descriptive generics are limited by the abnormality constraint only, which, crucially, allows us to characterize only the negative extension of the restriction, namely, the properties which are present in no precisification v-v 0 . These are the properties which are definitely considered properties of the minority of relevant P individuals, since adding them to the restriction will violate the requirement in (35) that we should end up quantifying over the majority of relevant P individuals. Crucially, however, we have no way 16 Notice that the restriction of in-virtue-of generics should be limited using both the relevant abnormality and abnormality constraints, since relevant abnormality alone is not enough to guarantee that we end up quantifying over the majority of relevant individuals. Suppose we hear (25) and accommodate 'in virtue of the fact that this place is so violent', so, for example, fully armed women are taken to be legitimate exceptions (they have a 'blocking property'). The problem arises when such a 'blocking' property happens to be a normal property, that is, a property of the majority of women in this town, so despite the violence most women in this town do walk alone outside. In such a situation, (25) is judged as false, but if the relevant abnormality in (42) is the only constraint we use, the sentence is wrongly predicted to be true. Adding the abnormality constraint in (25), then, ensures that only abnormal blocking properties legitimize exceptions to in-virtue-of generics.
to characterize the positive extension of the restriction with descriptive generics, that is, to find even one property X which is present in all precisifications v-v 0 , since, as explained in section 5.2 above, even if some property is clearly a property of the majority [e.g. 'not having a name beginning with A' in the case of (36) above], this does not yet ensure that it is a member of all precisifications (though it may be a member of some of them). Consequently, the negation of such a property (e.g. the abnormal property 'having a name ending with A') is a borderline case-there is no way to predict in advance that it definitely will or definitely will not characterize the exceptions to (36). The same procedure holds for any other property of the majority of relevant P individuals.
The higher degree of vagueness concerning the properties of the legitimate exceptions with descriptive generics, then, results from the fact that we end up with many more 'borderline' properties in the restriction than we do with in-virtue-of generics. 
Characterizing accessibility relations as (potentially) vague restrictions on worlds
We have just defined the restriction on the set of individuals as vaguer with descriptive than with in-virtue-of generics. But notice that we can also treat the difference between the in-virtue-of and descriptive accessibility relations as a difference in degree of vagueness: In Greenberg (2003) , the in-virtue-of accessibility relation is very specified: we look only at worlds where every member of the subject set has a contextually supplied in-virtue-of property (e.g. with 'A dog has four legs', we look only at the worlds where every dog has a four-legged genetic makeup). In contrast, with descriptive generics, no in-virtue-of property is specified, and consequently we do not specify the exact way that the accessible worlds are similar to w 0 , but define them in a vaguer way, as maximally or overall similar to w 0 . Thus, the degree of vagueness with respect to the restriction on individuals correlates with the degree of vagueness with respect to the restriction on worlds, as schematically summarized in (44):
17 While the lack of specification of properties of the majority in the restriction of unambiguously descriptive generics has the advantage of capturing the intuition about their vagueness with respect to the properties of their exceptions, a reviewer notes that this lack of specification may lead to problematic or too weak truth conditions for such generics. Further research should attempt to clarify whether more constraints on the restriction of descriptive generics is indeed needed and which intuitive judgments on the truth conditions and legitimate exceptions of such generics justify such additional constraints. Now, instead of unnecessarily defining two contrasts in the degree of vagueness (on "w and on "x), we can define only a difference in degree of vagueness of "w, and then define an algorithm which will derive from it the difference in degree of vagueness of "x.
Formalizing the intuitive difference in vagueness between the invirtue-of and the descriptive accessibility relations can be done by slightly deviating from Greenberg's (2003) original view, according to which with the former there is an in-virtue-of property in the semantic structure, whereas with the latter there is no such property at all (so we use 'maximal' or 'overall' similarity). In an alternative view, we can claim that with both types of generics we take the generalization to hold in virtue of some property. But that this property is specified to the speaker only with in-virtue-of generics, while with unambiguously descriptive ones, it is unknown or unspecified. Formally, we represent the accessibility relation as a set of propositions (and thus as a set of sets of worlds), which is precise in the case of in-virtue-of generics and vague in the case of descriptive generics. In both cases, we universally quantify over all worlds where every P member has the in-virtue-of, S, property:
With in-virtue-of generics, S is fixed in every context of utterance c. Consequently, in every context c, we end up with a precise set of worlds quantified over. For example, if in a context c where 'An accountant hardly pays taxes' is uttered we choose 'in virtue of being dishonest', then we quantify over all worlds where every accountant is dishonest. In contrast, with unambiguously descriptive generics like 'Norwegian students whose names end with ''s'' wear thick green socks', the choice of in-virtue-of property S is not resolved by context, that is, even in a specific context c S is unknown, so there are multiple potential properties playing its role in (45). Consequently, we end up having multiple propositions of the form "x P(s) / S(x) in (45) (e.g. "x P(s) / S 1 (x), "x P(s) / S 2 (x), "x P(s) / S 3 (x), etc.), and thus with multiple potential sets of accessible worlds, each of them represents one way of making the accessibility relation precise. We now define a restriction Xp on the set of individuals in (45) for both in-virtue-of and descriptive generics, which is sensitive to the (potentially vague) accessibility relation: Notice that unlike K&L's definition, the second member of the pair AEv 0 , vae is a set of properties, and not a set of sets of properties, that is, the restriction is not explicitly defined as vague. Nonetheless, it indirectly comes out as vague, with no need to stipulate vagueness, as in K&L's theory. The reason is that, given how the abnormality constraint is defined, the restriction can potentially contain various combinations of properties of the majority, and there is no unique set of properties which are chosen (as discussed above). Moreover, the dependency of (46) on the in-virtue-of property S [through the definition of relevant abnormality in (46b)] guarantees that it correctly comes out vaguer with descriptive generics than with in-virtue-of ones. Whereas in the latter the only source of vagueness is the vague extension of B AEAES,Qae,wae (i.e. which properties are considered complements of 'blocking properties' and which do not), in the former it is also the choice of what B AEAES,Qae,wae is in the first place, since we have complete vagueness with respect to the choice of S.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND COMPARISONS WITH OTHER EXCEPTIONS-TOLERANCE MECHANISMS
In this paper I showed that, despite the strong similarities between them, IS and BP generics differ in the degree to which the properties of their legitimate exceptions can be specified. I argued that this contrast is a special case of a much wider and deeper difference between IS and BP generics, namely, a difference in the accessibility relations, which is also manifested in felicity differences between them (originally observed in, e.g. Lawler 1973 ). I developed an improved version of the exceptions-tolerance mechanism for generic sentences suggested in Kadmon & Landman (1993) to account for the newly observed difference, namely, a restriction on the set of individuals quantified by Gen, which is partially vague to two degrees using supervaluationist methods. These two degrees of vagueness are not stipulated but follow from the systematic dependency of this restriction on the two types of accessibility relations that IS and BP generics are compatible with, which are redefined here as precise and vague restrictions on the domain of worlds.
The theory developed here has much in common with intuitions of other theories proposed in the genericity literature. I want to finish this paper by evaluating the success of the present theory to formally capture two such intuitions, relative to these other proposals.
Like many other theories of genericity, the present theory attempts to capture the intuitive observation that the exceptions to generics are somehow abnormal (what I called the abnormality constraint). Unlike the present theory, however, other theories use, in some way or another, the unanalysed adjective '(ab)normal' in their definitions. This, I suggest, is problematic. One type of problem is found with the well-known exceptions-tolerance mechanism of Krifka et al. (1995) and Krifka (1995) , in which the quantification over accessible worlds is further restricted to the worlds which are 'most normal', from the point of view of our world. The idea is that in those most normal worlds, abnormal things like mutations or accidents do not exist, so dogs with mutations or those who have undergone an accident are not quantified over (cf. Delgrande 1987 Delgrande , 1988 . However, treating mutations, accidents, etc. as abnormal is problematic, since a world completely free of such phenomena will be considered truly abnormal from the point of view of our world. A similar problem, noted by, for example, is that, under this proposal 'A bird flies' circularly means that 'every bird flies in all accessible most normal worlds (where among other things, birds fly)'.
The reason for these kinds of problems seems to be the fact that '(ab)normality' in the suggestion of Krifka et al. and Delgrande is total. This is avoided in theories which relativize (ab)normality to the subject property (e.g. with respect to being a dog), as in, e.g. Eckardt (1999) , Asher & Morreau (1995) and Pelletier & Asher (1997) . These theories, however, have no way to account for the systematic ability of language users, observed in section 3 above, to distinguish between those abnormal subject members who do and who do not count as legitimate exceptions, for example, for the fact that an individual dog can be 'abnormal for a dog' (e.g. infertile or with exceptional problems in its vocal cords), but nonetheless we would expect it to be covered by the generalization 'A dog has four legs'.
An intuitively better suggestion may be to relativize abnormality to the VP property, as suggested in circumscription theories like McCarthy (1986) or Drewery (1997) (e.g. requiring the exceptions to be abnormal with respect to having four legs). Such a suggestion, however, cannot account for the fact that the characterization of exceptions varies not only with respect to material in the sentence (the subject and VP) but also with respect to the accommodated material, as in example (25) above ('A woman in this place doesn't walk alone outside'). It was shown that considering individuals who are abnormal with respect to being a woman in this town and/or with respect to walking alone outside is not enough, since different types of such abnormal women are considered exceptions to (25) depending on the context in which the generic is uttered, which determines the in-virtueof factor of the sentence.
The present theory gives more precise content to what 'abnormal' means, as far as IS and BP generics are concerned. It defines 'abnormal' as 'having a property of the minority (of relevant individuals) which blocks the reasonable causation relation between the accommodated, in-virtue-of property and the VP property'. This allows the type of abnormality to vary depending on both material in the sentence, as well as accommodated material, and correctly predicts that when the invirtue-of factor cannot be accommodated-as in the out of the blue (25) or with unambiguously descriptive generics like (3b)-the type of abnormality relevant for legitimate exceptions cannot be specified either, that is, it is vague.
The present theory also attempts to capture the intuition that generics make claims about the majority of contextually relevant individuals in the subject set. This intuition is formulated in a simpler and an elegant way in , who abandons the common idea that generic quantification is universal, and argues instead that its quantificational force is similar to 'most'. The meaning of 'Dogs have four legs' in this theory is roughly 'Most dogs, in all admissible histories (continuing the present history) have four legs'. This has the immediate advantage that there is no need to stipulate any exceptions-tolerance mechanism.
There are, however, two main problems with such a move. The first is that this interpretation does not capture at all the widely held abnormality constraint. The exceptional dogs in (1), namely those with no four legs, constitute the minority, but nothing guarantees that they are abnormal in some other sense, relative to those with four legs. The second problem has to do with the observation, made in section 2 above, that taking exceptional entities as counterexamples to generics is evaluated as completely legitimate. I suggest that this can only happen if Gen is indeed universal. If the quantificational force with example (11) ('Professors wear a tie') was 'most', the cooperative listener would never say something like 'but look at Bill, he does not wear a tie!' [as in (12b) above], because he/she would not expect the quantification to range over all individuals in the first place. That is, if generics had a 'most'-like quantifier, we would wrongly expect the listener's reaction to (12b) to be as infelicitous as the ones in (47b):
(47) a.
Most (potential) professors wear a tie. b. #But look at Bill! He does not wear a tie! The fact that, unlike (47b), (12b) above is considered legitimate and felicitous indicates, then, that although many generics indeed make claims about the majority of individuals, the quantificational force of Gen cannot be that of 'most'. This is captured in the present analysis by defining Gen as universal, but at the same time restricting the individuals who are quantified over in such a way that no matter which precisification in the restriction is chosen, we end up indirectly quantifying over the majority of (relevant) individuals.
